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SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA1 
BY  DAVID  M.  KREPS AND ROBERT WILSON 
We propose a new criterion for equilibria of  extensive games, in the spirit of Selten's 
perfectness criteria. This criterion requires that players' strategies be sequentially rational: 
Every decision  must be part of  an optimal strategy for the remainder of  the game. This 
entails  specification  of  players' beliefs concerning  how  the  game  has  evolved  for  each 
information  set,  including  information  sets  off  the  equilibrium path.  The  properties of 
sequential equilibria are developed; in particular, we study the topological structure of the 
set of sequential equilibria. The connections with Selten's trembling-hand perfect equilibria 
are given. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
WE PROPOSE  A NEW CRITERION  for equilibrium in extensive games. The force of 
this  criterion  stems  from  the  stringent  requirement  of  sequential rationality 
imposed  on  the behavior of  every player: Every decision  must be  part of  an 
optimal  strategy for  the  remainder of  the  game.  In  games  with  imperfect  or 
incomplete information, this requirement entails conformity with  Savage's [13] 
axioms of  choice under uncertainty: At  every juncture the player's subsequent 
strategy must be optimal with respect to some assessment of the probabilities of 
all uncertain events, including any preceding but unobserved choices  made by 
other players. Mathematically, this is accomplished by broadening what is meant 
by an equilibrium. An equilibrium is not simply a strategy, but consists instead of 
two  types  of  probability  assessments  by  the  players:  the  beliefs of  a  player 
concerning where in  the game  tree he is whenever it is his  turn to  choose  an 
action, and his conjecture concerning what will happen in the future as given by 
the strategy. The novel aspect is the specification of beliefs on information sets 
that lie off the equilibrium path (that is, that have prior probability zero in the 
equilibrium). The  specification  of  these  beliefs  allows  us  to  verify  that  the 
player's own strategy is optimal starting from every point in the tree. 
In  this exposition we  consider only  games in which each player has perfect 
recall; cf. Kuhn [7]. For such games, sequential equilibria admit the following 
construction: In each player's personal decision  tree induced by  the game tree 
(cf. Wilson [16]) there is an appropriate assessment of the probabilities assigned 
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to all conditional uncertain events for which his strategy is among  the optimal 
responses obtained  by  backwards recursion via dynamic programming. (These 
assessments are also required to be consistent among the players, in a fashion to 
be  explained.)  This  encompasses  the  formulation  of  games  with  incomplete 
information  due  to  Harsanyi  [3]:  A  sequential  equilibrium provides  at  each 
juncture an equilibrium in the subgame (of incomplete information) induced by 
restarting the game at that point. 
Our definition of a sequential equilibrium recasts and slightly weakens Selten's 
[15] definition of a perfect equilibrium.  Selten's definition accomplishes two things 
at  once:  It  implicitly generates beliefs  at  information  sets off  the  equilibrium 
path,  and  it  requires that players' strategies be  optimal  with  respect to  those 
beliefs. In addition, it eliminates from consideration strategies that are otherwise 
weakly dominated. In a sequential equilibrium, the former is explicitly done, and 
the  latter  is  dropped.  Thus  every  perfect  equilibrium  is  sequential,  but  not 
conversely. We prove, however, that if the former is done,  then it is rarely the 
case that the latter is necessary; for "almost all" games the perfect and sequential 
equilibria "nearly" coincide.  Thus,  generically, the  two  concepts  are identical 
mathematically. 
We have two motives for proposing this alteration of  Selten's definition. The 
first is pragmatic: In many examples of interest (e.g., in Kreps and Wilson [6], 
Milgrom and Roberts [8], and Rubinstein [12]), it is vastly easier to verify that a 
given equilibrium is sequential than that it is perfect. Second, making explicit the 
construction  of  beliefs  off  the  equilibrium path  enables  discussion  of  which 
beliefs  are  "plausible" and  which  are  not.  Such  discussion  is  difficult  in  the 
context of Selten's mechanical and indirect procedure for generating beliefs. And 
such  comparisons  can  often  help  one  to  choose  among  sequential/perfect 
equilibria. (An example is given in Kreps and Wilson [6], where there is unique 
along-the-equilibrium-path behavior among  all  sequential equilibria whose  be- 
liefs  meet  an  intuitively plausible monotonicity  condition.  Another example  is 
given  here in  Section  8.)  Indeed,  we  have  found  that by  making  the  idea  of 
beliefs explicit, the concept of a sequential equilibrium becomes consonant with 
the  received  tradition of  single-person decision  theory,  and  so  it  is  easier  to 
explain to nonspecialists. 
The  paper is  organized as  follows.  In  Section  2  a  formulation  of  extensive 
games  with  perfect  recall  is  given.  The  definitions  of  Nash  equilibrium and 
Selten's  concept  of  subgame-perfect equilibrium (Selten  [14]) are reviewed  in 
Section  3.  In  Section  4,  we  present examples  that  motivate  restrictions more 
severe than subgame-perfection. Then we give the key definitions of beliefs and 
an assessment, and we formally define a sequentially rational assessment. 
A  sequential  equilibrium  is  a  sequentially  rational  assessment  that  meets 
certain further consistency  criteria. For example, beliefs  along  the equilibrium 
path  should  be  computed  from  the  strategy via  Bayes' rule. In  Section  5  we 
present the consistency criterion that we subsequently use, and we motivate this 
criterion by a series of examples. SEQUENTIAL  EQUILIBRIA  865 
Properties of sequential equilibria are presented in Section 6. Basic properties 
are established: They  are Nash,  exist for all games, and have  an upper hemi- 
continuous  correspondence over the  space  of  payoffs.  Then  we  consider  their 
relation to Selten's subgame-perfection concept and an extension of this concept. 
Lastly, we  study the structure of  the set of  sequential equilibria for "generic" 
games. 
In Section 7 we compare Selten's criterion for (trembling-hand) perfect equilib- 
rium with our criterion for sequential equilibrium. The basic results are as stated 
above:  Every perfect equilibrium is sequential. Conversely, for generic payoffs 
the  sets  of  perfect  and  sequential  equilibria "nearly" coincide.  (The  possible 
exceptions are limited to weak equilibria; and there is complete coincidence  of 
the sets of "equilibrium paths.") This generic equality of sequential and perfect 
equilibria becomes  an  exact identity if one  weakens the defining apparatus of 
perfect equilibria to allow perturbations of the payoffs. 
In Section 8 we develop the idea that explicit consideration of the beliefs off 
the  equilibrium  path  can  help  one  to  choose  among  sequential  equilibria. 
Concluding remarks are made in Section 9. 
The  technical results of  Sections  6  and  7  are proved  in  an  Appendix.  The 
Appendix also gives several additional characterizations that are not discussed in 
the text. 
2.  EXTENSIVE GAMES 
We will use a formulation of an extensive game that is equivalent to Kuhn's 
[7]. In this formulation, the following are specified: (1) the physical order of play; 
(2) the choices available to a player whenever it is his turn to move; (3) rules for 
determining whose  move  it  is  at  any  point;  (4)  the  information a  player has 
whenever it is his turn to move; (5) the payoffs to the players as functions of the 
moves  they  select;  (6)  the initial conditions  that begin  the game  (that  is,  the 
actions of nature). 
We illustrate our formulation with the following example of a game with two 
players. Player 1 moves first and chooses between three actions: L, R, A. If player 
1 chooses A, then the game ends, with payoffs zero to each player. If 1 chooses L 
or R, then it is 2's turn to choose between actions I and r, after which the game 
ends, and payoffs are made. When and if 2 does get to choose between I and r, 2 
does not know which of L and R 1 chose-2  knows only that 1 did not choose A. 
A diagrammatic representation of this is given in Figure 1. 
Mathematically, the formulation is constructed from the following objects: 
(1) The physical order of play is given by a finite set T of nodes together with a 
binary relation  -<  on  T that represents precedence. In  the example,  the set  T 
consists  of  eight points:  the  open  circle,  the  two  closed  circles, and  the  four 
column vectors. Precedence is indicated by arrows-one  node precedes another 
if there is a sequence of arrows pointing from the first to the second. The binary 
relation  -<  must be a partial order, and (T, -<) must form an arborescence: The 866  D.  M. KREPS AND  R. WILSON 
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FIGURE  1. 
relation  -<  totally orders the predecessors of each member of  T. (This prevents 
cycles from appearing in the order of play, and it means that each node in the 
tree can be reached by one and only one path from an initial node through the 
tree.) Useful auxiliary notation and definitions are compiled in Table I. 
TABLE I 
NOTATION  AND  DEFINITIONS  FOR EXTENSIVE  GAMES 
Name  Notation  Definition 
terminal nodes or outcomes  Z  {  t E T  t has no successors} 
decision nodes  X  T\Z 
initial nodes or states  W  {  t E T  t has no predecessors} 
predecessors of t  P(t)  {x E X  x  <  t} 
immediate predecessor of t  pI(t)  max{x  x  <  t}  for t :  W 
nth predecessor of t  pn(t)  P  I(t))  for  t such  that pn_  (t)  W; 
po(t) =  t for all t 
number of predecessors of t  1(t)  I(t) is such that pl(t,)(t)  E  W 
immediate successors of x  S(x)  pj  l(x) for x E X 
terminal successors of x  Z(x)  {z E Z:  x -< z} for x E X 
Note  that we depict the terminal nodes (nodes in Z)  by column vectors (the 
meaning of which will be discussed below), the decision nodes (nodes in X)  by 
circles, and the initial nodes (nodes in W) by open circles. In the example there is 
a  single initial node,  but  in  general there may  be  more  than  one  element  of 
W-see  the game depicted in Figure 8 for an example. 
The following interpretations are made: The game begins at one of the initial 
nodes  (determined by  nature-see  below)  and  then proceeds along  some path 
from node to immediate successor, terminating when a terminal node is reached. 
The various paths give the various possible  orders of  play.  In many  games of 
interest, especially games with simultaneous moves, more than one  tree can be 
used to represent the game. 
(2) To represent the choices available to players at decision nodes, we have a 
finite set A  of actions and a function a:  T\ W -->A  that labels each non-initial 
node with the last action taken to reach it. In the figures, the actions are labelled 
along the branches, so that the L on the uppermost left-hand branch is read as 
saying that action L leads from the initial node to the node below and to the left 
of it. In terms of the function a, L is the value of a at the node below and to the 
left of the initial node. Note  that a(S(x))  is thus the set of feasible actions at the SEQUENTIAL  EQUILIBRIA  867 
decision  node x.  For example, the set of  actions feasible at the initial node  is 
{  L, R, A }.  We  require  that  a  be  one-to-one  on  the  set  S(x)  of  immediate 
successors of x. 
(3) To represent the rules for determining whose move it is at a decision node, 
we have  a finite set I  of players and  a  function  t: X --  I  that assigns to  each 
decision node the player whose turn it is. In Figure 1, the 1 above the initial node 
records that it is player l's  move at that point, and the 2 connected  to the two 
other decision  nodes by  the dashed line records that it is 2's move  at each of 
those two points. 
(4) Information possessed by players is represented by a partition H of X that 
divides the decision nodes into information  sets. The cell H(x)  of H that contains 
x  identifies the decision nodes that player t(x) cannot distinguish from x  based 
on the information he has available when it is his turn to choose an action at x. 
We depict information sets by connecting nodes in a single information set with 
a dashed line. Thus in Figure 1, the dashed line connecting  the two non-initial 
decision nodes denotes  that these two nodes lie in  the same information set- 
player 2, when it is his turn to choose an action, doesn't know whether 1 chose L 
or R. We require that a player knows when it is his turn to choose  and which 
actions are feasible: 
(2.1)  If x E  H(x'),  then t(x)  =  t(x') and a (S(x))  =  a (S(x')). 
Thus it makes sense to write t(h) and to partition H into sets H' = t  '(i). (In our 
figures, we label information sets instead of  nodes with players.) It also makes 
sense to write A (h) for a (S(h)),  the set of actions feasible at information set h. 
(Note that 2's feasible actions at the two non-initial nodes are identical. What we 
really have  is  that 2  can  choose  between  I and  r at  his  information set.)  For 
notational  convenience,  we  assume  that  a  is  onto  and  that  for  each  a E A, 
A -  '(a)  is  a  singleton  set. That  is,  each  action  can  be  taken only  in  a  single 
information set. Then we can partition A  into sets A'  =  {a: A - '(a) 5  H')  for 
i E  I. 
We also assume that each player has perfect recall. Each player knows whether 
he chose previously: 
(2.2)  If x E H(x'),  then x Ak  x'. 
And he knows whatever he knew previously, including his previous actions: 
(2.3)  If x, x', x" E t- '(i), x -< x', and H(x')  = H(x"),  then H(x) 
includes some predecessor of x" at which the same action was chosen 
as was chosen at x; that is P(x")  n  H(x)  =  { x0}, and if x = pn(x') 
and xo = pm(x"),  then a (pn- ,  (x')) =  a (pm- ,  (x ")). 868  D.  M. KREPS AND  R. WILSON 
The collection  {  T, -<;  A, a;  I, t;  H } defines an extensive form. To  obtain an 
extensive game we  add  a  specification  of  the players' utilities assigned  to  the 
terminal nodes and the probabilities assigned to the initial nodes. 
(5) For each player i, the payoff function u': Z --  R assigns a real-valued von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility to each outcome. We denote a specification of the 
payoffs by u =  (u'(z))  E RI'  Z.  In our pictorial representations, we simply write 
the vector of payoffs to the players (player 1 first, player 2 second, etc.) for the 
terminal node. For example, in Figure 1, if player 1 plays L and 2 plays 1, then 
the payoffs are 3 to player 1 and  - 1  to player 2. 
(6)  Player i's initial assessment p'  is a probability measure on  the  set  W of 
states or initial nodes. (For notational convenience,  we have put all actions by 
nature at the "start" of the game.) To keep matters simple, we henceforth assume 
that the players' initial assessments are strictly positive  and  are all  the  same: 
p i _  p >>  0.  When  necessary,  we  depict  initial  assessments  by  recording  the 
probability p(w) in braces next to the node w. 
A  pure strategy for  player  i  is  an  assignment  a':  H' -  A  such  that  a'(h) 
E  A (h). This specifies what action player i will take each time it is his turn to 
choose, based on the information that he possesses. One defines a mixed strategy 
for  player  i  as  a  probability  distribution over  the  set  of  his  pure  strategies. 
However  Kuhn  [7] shows  that for games  with perfect recall it  is  sufficient  to 
restrict attention to behavior  strategies, hereafter simply called strategies. 
(7) A strategy q' : A '-i  [0, 1  ] for player i assigns to each information set h E  H' 
a  probability  measure  on  the  set  A (h).  That  is,  Ea,A(h)'7T(a) 
=  1,  for  each 
h E  H'. 
Let I'  denote the set of strategies for player i, and let 171= X iETI71 be the set 
of strategies for the game. Each strategy 7T  E 17 induces a probability measure P' 
on the set Z of outcomes according to the formula: 
1(z) 
P  (Z)  =  P(PI(Z)(Z))  ]7J  (Pl  (PI(-  I  (Z))). 
The expectation operator using P" is denoted E  [-];  in particular, E  [ui(z)]  is 
player  i's  expected  utility  from  the  strategy  7T.  We  shall  frequently  use  the 
notation P`(x)  and P`(h)  for P"(Z(x))  and P`(Z(h)),  respectively. 
A subform of an extensive form is a collection of nodes  T C  T, together with 
<,  t,  A,  oa and  H  all  defined  on  T  by  restriction, satisfying  closure  under 
succession  and  preservation of  information  sets:  S(x)  C  T  and  H(x)  C  T  if 
x E  T. For  every node  x E  X  there is a  minimal subform  T(x)  containing  x. 
Note  that x need not be an initial node in T(x)  (cf. Figure 8). A proper subform 
(following Selten [14]) is a subform T consisting solely of  some node x  and its 
successors. In this case we call x  the root of  T. Given a proper subform T with 
root x,  there is  a  well-defined  proper subgame  starting with  x  as  the  unique 
initial node. That is, the game is formed by T and all the structure that T inherits 
from  the  original  form,  the  payoffs  u  restricted  to  T n Z,  and  the  initial 
assessment  A(x)  =  1. For  nonproper subforms a  subgame  is  not  always  well- SEQUENTIAL  EQUILIBRIA  869 
defined,  if  the initial assessment p is  lacking. (Example: in  Figure  1, the  two 
nodes that form player 2's information set together with the four terminal nodes 
that follow  constitute a  nonproper subform. Note  that if  we  tried to  define  a 
subgame for this subform, we would be lacking an initial assessment on the two 
(now initial) nodes.) 
3.  NASH  EQUILIBRIA AND  SUBGAME  PERFECTION 
The weakest criterion for equilibrium that we shall discuss is the familiar one 
proposed originally by Nash [11]. A strategy is a Nash equilibrium  if each player's 
strategy is an optimal response to the other players' strategies. That is, g E II is a 
Nash equilibrium if, for each player i E  I, 
ET  [u'(z)]  >  ET  u'(z)]  for every strategy 7T  E rl 
such that FTi  =  7Tr  forj  #  i. 
This definition has been motivated in many ways, and we shall not attempt to 
repeat those motivations  here. But a  thread common  to  all of  them is  that if 
players  are  to  arrive  at  some  "agreed-upon" mode  of  behavior,  then  it  is 
necessary that  this  behavior  constitutes  a  Nash  equilibrium. Otherwise, some 
player would find it advantageous to defect from the agreement. (The different 
interpretations vary  in  their  explanations  of  how  it  might  be  that  such  an 
agreement would arise, whether such an agreement must be explicit, etc.) 
Consideration  of  games  in  extensive  form  lead  to  other,  more  stringent 
necessary conditions for "agreed-upon" behavior. One such condition is Selten's 
[14] criterion of subgame-perfection.  Consider the game depicted in Figure 2. One 
Nash equilibrium for this game has player 1 choosing L and player 2 choosing 1. 
Note  well that 1 chooses L because he anticipates the choice of I by 2, while 2 is 
content to choose I only because his choice is irrelevant so long as  1 chooses L. 
But if  1 were to choose R, then it seems reasonable to suppose that 2, facing this 
fait  accompli, would choose r. And  1, realizing this, "should" choose  R.  Selten 
[14] has formalized this intuition in the following criterion. 
DEFINITION:  Strategy ST  is  subgame perfect if  for  every proper subgame  the 
strategy 7T  restricted to  the  subgame  constitutes  a  Nash  equilibrium for  the 
subgame. 
This definition makes sense because in any proper subgame it makes sense to 
speak  of  each  player's  expected  utility  in  that  subgame,  and  thus  the  Nash 
l  L  1L  I  R  2 
-1  0 
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criterion can be applied (in Figure 2, to the subgame with root x). (In Selten [14], 
nature's moves  are not  all put at  the beginning of  the tree T. This gives him 
"'more"  proper subgames and, correspondingly, more applications for the crite- 
rion above. The difference is insignificant. We have put nature's moves at the 
beginning of  the tree for convenience  only-nothing  in the analysis changes if 
this is relaxed. We could also remedy matters by calling a subform T proper if 
there  is a unique probability distribution p on  W such that p(w)P[W]  = 
for all w E  W-then  this p is the natural candidate for the initial assessment.) 
And  it is a  natural restriction for any  "agreed-upon" behavior-otherwise  the 
agreement would not hold up if the subgame were reached. Accordingly  some 
player might defect from the agreement and cause the subgame to be reached, 
anticipating a breakdown of the agreement favorable to himself. 
4.  BELIEFS AND  SEQUENTIAL RATIONALITY 
Selten has gone  on  to observe that the intuitive motivation for the subgame 
perfection criterion can be applied to games that lack proper subgames. This is 
illustrated by  the game  depicted in  Figure 3,  taken from [15, Section  6]. One 
Nash  equilibrium for this game has player  1 choosing  D,  player 2 choosing a, 
and player 3 choosing 1. This equilibrium is subgame perfect, as the only proper 
subgame here is  the game itself. But, as  Selten argues, this equilibrium is  not 
sensible. The behavior of player 2 is hard to justify, if it is supposed that 3 will 
choose 1. Note that player 2's information set is a singleton, and therefore there is 
no difficulty in taking the other players' strategies as given and asking: If this 
node  is  reached,  then  what  action  is  optimal  for  2? That  is,  the  conditional 
expected payoff to 2 on reaching x is calculable from the strategies of the other 
players. Given the supposed behavior of 3, 2 prefers to choose d. (The reader can 
verify  that if  1 realizes this, then  1 would  optimally  choose  A  instead  of  D, 
thereby upsetting the equilibrium. The only "sensible" equilibrium in this game 
has 1 choosing A, 2 choosing a, and 3 choosing r with probability at least 3/4.) 
The  subgame perfection criterion, as formally defined, fails in  this example, 
because  there is not  a proper subgame starting from the node  x-player  3  is 
unable  to  compute  his  expected  utility  in  this  subgame.  But  because  this 
information  set  for  2  is  a  singleton,  we  can  compute  expected  utility  for  2 
1  A  x  2  a  1 
lD  |d 
*  3  -3 
3  0  4  0 
2  0  4  0 
2  0  0  1 
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conditional  on  hitting  this  information  set,  and  this  is  enough  to  reject  the 
supposed equilibrium. A  corresponding general criterion can be  formulated as 
follows:  A  strategy 7T should be  such  that for any  information set h  that is a 
singleton, player t(h) should not be able to change his strategy unilaterally and 
thereby improve this expected utility starting from h. 
The  restriction of  this criterion to  singleton  information  sets h  is  necessary 
mathematically,  so  that  player  t(h)'s  expected  utility  starting from  h  can  be 
calculated. But it does limit the applicability of the criterion. Consider the game 
depicted in Figure 4. A Nash equilibrium for this game has  1 choosing A, and 2 
choosing r. This strategy is subgame perfect, and it satisfies the further criterion 
given above. But if  1 gives the move to 2, then regardless of what 2 thinks the 
chances are that he is at one node or the other in his information set, 2 will do 
better by choosing  1. And  if  1 realizes this and concludes  that 2 will choose  1, 
then 1 will optimally pick L. 
We are unable to apply the subgame perfection criterion or the other criterion 
above for technical reasons: The strategy w does not provide sufficient informa- 
tion to compute player 2's expected payoff conditional on reaching his informa- 
tion set. But if 2 is rational in the sense of Savage [131-when  faced with a choice 
2 makes some assessment about what 1 did that is consistent with what 2 knows, 
and then optimizes accordingly-then  2 will choose  1. This is the substance of 
sequential rationality: The strategy of each player starting from each information 
set must be optimal starting from there according to some assessment over the 
nodes in the information set and the strategies of everyone else. 
To formalize this, as part of the description of an equilibrium we specify for 
each information set h the assessment made by player t(h) over the nodes in h if 
h is reached. A system of beliefs is defined as a function jt: X -> [0, 1] such that 
Exeh  A  (x) =  1 for each h E H. Interpret jt(x) as the probability assigned by t(h) 
to x E h if h is reached. An assessment is a pair (i,  7T)  consisting of a system of 
beliefs  y  and a strategy 7T.  Given an assessment (j,  7T),  for each h E  H  we can 
define "conditional" probability P,'y(.  I  h) over Z in the obvious fashion: 
If z X  Z(h),  then P,'T(z I  h) = 0. 
If z E  Z(h),  say pn(z)  E h, 
n 
then  P ,7'  (z I  h) =  y (Pn  (z))  I 
71 (a(Pm -I  (z))) 
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(We shall use notation such as P,'T(h' I  h) as shorthand for P,(Z(h')  I  h) when 
convenient.)  Denoting  conditional  expectations  by  E"'T[ I h], we  say  that  the 
assessment is sequentially rational if, for all h E  H, 
EI',[  ut(h)(z)  I  h] >  El"7[ Ut(h)(z) I  h] 
for all 7- such that 7-i  =  7Tj forj  #&  t(h). 
In words, taking the beliefs as fixed, no player prefers at any point to change his 
part of the strategy 7T. 
A  sequential equilibrium, roughly speaking, is a  sequentially rational assess- 
ment  (t, 7T). This  is  only  a  rough definition  because  we  first want  to  impose 
consistency conditions, such as that assessments obey Bayes' rule when it applies. 
We develop these conditions and give the corresponding definition of a sequen- 
tial  equilibrium in  the  next  section.  The  point  to  be  stressed here is  that  an 
assessment (and not simply a strategy) will or will not be a sequential equilibrium. 
We require that an equilibrium specify beliefs as well as strategies. 
Selten [15] suggests a  somewhat  different "cure" for  the problem posed  by 
examples such as the game depicted in Figure 4. He proposes a criterion called 
(among game theorists) "trembling-hand" perfection. We describe this criterion 
and its relation to ours in Section 7. 
5.  CONSISTENT ASSESSMENTS AND  SEQUENTIAL  EQUILIBRIA 
We begin by giving the formal definition of a consistent assessment (  j,  7T)  and 
the corresponding definition of a sequential equilibrium. Let II? be the set of all 
strictly positive strategies. That is,  sr E  II? if 7(a)  > 0 for all a E  A.  If -  E II?H, 
then  P'(x)  > 0  for  all  x,  and  the  only  reasonable  way  to  define  beliefs  y 
associated with w is via Bayes' rule: 
M(x)  =  P'(x)/P'(H(x)). 
Let  jO denote that subset of the set of assessments (  , 7T)  where 7T  E  IHo  and jt is 
defined from p and 7T  by Bayes' rule. 
DEFINITION:  An  assessment (  j,  ST)  is consistent if  ( A, 7) =  limn  *cO(  jns,  W)  for 
some sequence  {(  ,n, ,Tn)} C  gI's.  The set of consistent assessments is denoted by 
I.  (That is,  I  is the closure of  J?.) 
A  sequential equilibrium is  an  assessment  (jt, 7T)  that is  both  consistent  and 
sequentially rational. 
This  definition  of  consistency  is  not  completely  intuitive  on  its  own.  We 
propose it because it neatly embodies a number of  distinct intuitive notions  of 
consistency. To provide motivation, we now survey those more intuitive notions. 
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defined from 7T  by Bayes' rule whenever possible: 
(5.1)  pt(x)PT(H(x))  = PT(x). 
Note  that, since p is used to define P"T,  consistency with p is embodied  in this 
definition. This very basic criterion is clearly implied by ([t, w) CE  I. 
This uniquely defines jt(x)  for any x  such that P'(H(x))  > 0. What happens 
when a player reaches an information set h with P'(h)  = O? It is plausible to 
suppose that the player will construct some hypothesis as to how the game has 
been played, in the form of a strategy 7T'  that satisfies P"'(h) > 0 and then use 7T' 
and Bayes' rule to  compute jt(x)  for x  E  h. This procedure limits the possible 
beliefs  of  a player. For  example, in  the part of  a  game  depicted  in  Figure 5, 
player  2's  beliefs  in  his  information  set  must  attach  probability  1/3  to  the 
left-hand  node.  This  is  because  player  1 cannot  distinguish between  the  two 
nodes in his information set, so any strategy he could hypothesize that gives 2's 
information  set  positive  probability must  (by  Bayes'  rule) preserve the  initial 
probability assessment. That is, simply assuming that the players' beliefs always 
respect  the  informational  structure  of  the  game  constrains  players'  beliefs. 
Formally: 
(5.2)  (  j,  7T)  is structurally  consistent  if for each h E  H there exists some 
strategy 7T'  E  11 such that P`'(h)  > 0 and jt(x)  =  P`'(x)/Pv'(h) 
for all x  E h. 
If (  , 7T)  E  17, then (  j,  7T)  is structurally consistent. (A direct proof is easy.) 
One can carry this "alternative hypothesis" story a step further. Fix a player i. 
His  "primary hypothesis" as  to how  the game will be  played  is  TT, and  if  his 
beliefs obey (5.1), then he applies 7T to compute y  whenever possible. We might 
assume that when w does not apply-when  he comes to an information set h with 
P'(h)  = 0-then  he has a "second most likely hypothesis" 7T(2)  that he attempts 
to apply. If that fails, he tries his "third most likely hypothesis" 7T(3),  and so on. 
Formally, we  suppose  that each  player i  has  a  finite  sequence  of  hypotheses 
7T(1) =  7T, 7T(2),  7T(3), . ..  , 7T(K), where for each h E  H',  p,(k)  (h) > 0  for some 
k <  K, and  that jt(x)  for x  E  h is computed using Bayes' rule applied to  that 
7T(k) of lowest index k  that satisfies pv(k)  (h) > 0. The force in  this is that the 
sequence of  "alternative hypotheses" is independent  of  h-7T(2)  is the player's 
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requires that all players use the same finite sequence g(1) =  w, g(2), .  ...  ,(K). 
This requirement is in the spirit of the "common knowledge" hypothesis of Nash 
equilibrium-if  there are rational secondary hypotheses, they should be unani- 
mously  held, just  as  is  the  primary hypothesis  w. We  call  this  strengthened 
consistency criterion lexicographic  consistency. 
A  comparison  of  lexicographic  consistency  and  our  original  definition  of 
consistency  is  made  easy  by  the  following  result.  Let  A\ be  the  set  of  all 
probability measures on Z of the form P'  for 7T  E  LI. 
LEMMA  1: A sufficient condition  for ( ,u,  7T)  to satisfy lexicographic consistency is 
that there exists  a  sequence of probability measures {Pn)}  C A such that limnPn 
=  P'  and, for each x,  ,u(x) = lim,,Pn  (x)/Pf  (H(x)). 
The proof is left to the reader. (The methods used in the Appendix  to prove 
Lemma A2 are easily adapted to this case.) The criterion embodied in this lemma 
is a bit stronger than lexicographic consistency, and the analogous criterion that 
is equivalent to lexicographic consistency is a bit cumbersome. (Essentially, one 
must  allow  P,n that  are in  the  convex  hull  of  A, and  that  are asymptotically 
"close" to A\.)  But since this criterion is clearly implied by our original definition 
of  consistency,  we  see  that  lexicographic  consistency  is  subsumed  by  that 
definition. 
Consideration of  some examples motivates further restrictions. Consider, for 
example,  the  part  of  an  extensive  game  (with  strategies and  beliefs)  that  is 
depicted in Figure 6. (Beliefs are depicted in square brackets, and strategies in 
parentheses.) In particular, compare player 2's beliefs in his two information sets. 
We claim that these beliefs are inconsistent with each other and with player 3's 
strategy. For if player 2 reaches his first information set and adopts the beliefs 
shown, then he expects (given 3's strategy) to reach his second information set. 
And if he uses Bayes' rule starting from his first information set together with 3's 
strategy in order to obtain his beliefs in the second, he would not come up with 
the beliefs shown. This does not violate Bayesian or lexicographic consistency; 
for the latter, the "secondary hypothesis" 7T(2) simply has both players 1 and 3 
changing their strategy. In this instance, what is wanted is an extension of Bayes' 
rule. For a single player, this might be formulated as: 
(5.3)  Py T(x' I  h) = A  (x')P  ', (h' I  h) 
for all h, h', and x' such that t(h) = t(h'), h -< h', and x' E h'. 
(0)  191  (1)  2 
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In words, starting from any information set, a player uses his beliefs at that point 
together with  g  and  Bayes' rule to compute  subsequent beliefs when possible. 
The key here is the continued use of g after an initial defection. The philosophy 
behind  this is  that  the  strategy -r at  an  information  set  h  should  encode  the 
players' conjectures concerning what will happen if h is reached. If h is reached 
only by a defection, then g at h should encode what will subsequently happen, 
conditional on  that initial defection.  A first defection  does  not make a second 
more likely; correlation in defections are (partially) ruled out. 
A  referee has  suggested  an  extension  to  (5.3),  following  the  principle  that 
rational beliefs should be common knowledge and thus commonly shared. If one 
accepts  this,  then  in  the  spirit of  (5.3)  we  could  remove  the  restriction that 
l(h)  =  t(h')  as  follows: 
(5.4)  P  ' (x' I  h) ,u(x) =  P  IT(x  I  h) ,u(x') 
for all h, h', x, and x' such that x, x' E/ h' and x, x' E  S(h). 
(The motivation for this will become clear if the reader draws the picture entailed 
and re-expresses the equation in ratio form.) One special case implied by (5.4) 
deserves mention. This is where h in (5.4) is a singleton set. For this case (5.4) can 
be paraphrased: Players use Bayes' rule applied to g in any proper subgames that 
arise. Of course, (5.4) implies (5.3) (sum over x  E  h'), and both are implied by 
our general consistency condition. 
Consider lastly the piece of  the extensive game given in Figure 7. Player 3's 
beliefs are explicable as follows. Upon unexpectedly reaching his information set, 
he reconstructs the play of the game as follows:  1 changed his strategy to .9 for 
the upper branch, and 2 changed his to give positive probability to a move to the 
right. With this as  gi(2), these beliefs are lexicographically consistent. And  it is 
easy to verify that (5.4) is satisfied. But are 3's beliefs reasonable? If one grants 
the principle that defections from the equilibrium strategy ought to be uncorre- 
lated-that  given that 2 has defected (which he surely must have, given that 3's 
information set  has  been  reached),  the  most  likely  (in  a  lexicographic sense) 
hypothesis is that  1 continues  to play according  to n-then  the answer is no. 
Player 3 should give more credence to the hypothesis that only player 2 defected, 
and  he  should  therefore have  beliefs  .1  at  the  top-most  node.  (This  example 
becomes even more stark if we suppose that players 2 and 3 are the same. Then 
the defection by 2 is known to 3-should  this player revise his assessments as to 
what 1 did because he himself defected?) 
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Our initial consistency criterion is advanced as the way to patch up this final 
difficulty (as well as all the ones encountered previously) and, simultaneously, to 
invoke the "common knowledge" principle for beliefs. Comparison with Lemma 
1 is  useful:  We  require not  only  convergence  of  the  probability  distribution 
on endpoints to the distribution given by  7T (as in Lemma 1), but convergence to 
the strategy 7T everywhere, including those parts of the tree that could be reached 
only if an initial defection  occurred. This is equivalent to lexicographic consis- 
tency where we add restrictions on how players devise their secondary hypothe- 
ses g(2), v(3),  ...  ; v(2)  should be a "minimal change" from 7T,  and so forth. To 
state precisely the equivalent lexicographic characterization of  the  consistency 
criterion is  quite  involved,  and  we  have  relegated it  to  the  first part of  the 
Appendix. The interested reader may wish at this point to read that part of the 
Appendix, in order to understand how our consistency criterion formalizes two 
ideas:  no  correlation in  defections  from v;  common  knowledge  in  secondary 
hypotheses and in the formulation of beliefs. 
Upon  studying the first part of  the Appendix, the reader may well conclude 
that we have required too much consistency in beliefs off the equilibrium path. 
Certainly, weaker consistency criteria can be posed that make sense in particular 
contexts. (But beware: By dropping (5.4), subgame perfection is lost.) We shall 
proceed  here  to  develop  the  properties of  sequential  equilibrium as  defined 
above;  however,  we  do  so  with  some  doubts  of  our  own  concerning  what 
"ought" to  be  the  definition  of  a  consistent  assessment  that,  with  sequential 
rationality, will give the "proper" definition of a sequential equilibrium. 
6.  PROPERTIES OF SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 
We begin by establishing that standard properties hold for sequential equilib- 
ria. 
PROPOSITION  1: For every extensive game, there exists at  least one sequential 
equilibrium. 
PROPOSITION  2:  Fixing an extensive  form, the correspondence  from pairs (p, u) of 
initial assessments and payoffs to the set of sequential equilibria  for  the game so 
defined is upper  hemi-continuous. 
Proposition  1 is an easy corollary of  Proposition 5 and Theorem 5 of  Selten 
[15]. The proof of Proposition 2 follows the usual lines and is left to the reader. 
The next result is no more than a marshalling of definitions. 
PROPOSITION  3:  If ( ,u,  7T)  is a sequential equilibrium,  then 7T is a subgame  perfect 
Nash equilibrium. 
Recall  that  subgame  perfection  is  limited  to  proper subforms  because  for 
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ily yield an initial assessment p on the set of initial nodes  W of  T. If the given 
strategy 7T  is such that P'(  W) > 0, then the appropriate choice for p is manifestly 
p  =  Pw  (  w)/P(W);  in  this  case  it  is  easy  to  show  that  if  7T is  a  Nash 
equilibrium then w restricted to T is a Nash equilibrium on the subgame given by 
T,  A,  and u. Of course, in general  will not be strictly positive. 
In  seeking  to  extend  this  construction  to  general  subforms  we  make  the 
following definition. 
DEFINITION:  The strategy S  is extended subgame perfect if for every subform 
T there exists a nonnegative probability measure 
A  on  W such that together with 
p on  W, (a) 7T is a Nash  equilibrium for the game defined from T, p and u; and 
_~~~~~~~~7b  T  A  A 
(b) if T C T are two subforms such that P  T(  7'  T  ') > 0, then p is defined from w 
and 
A  by Bayes' formula. 
(We have not formally defined Pq'r(.  I  T), but its definition should be appar- 
ent.) Part (b) of this definition can be paraphrased: The initializing measures p 
are related to each other (and to p) in the natural fashion, given 7T. 
PROPOSITION  4:  If  (u, 7T)  is  a  sequential equilibrium, then (t,  U7)  is  extended 
subgame  perfect. 
The  proof  is  left  to  the  reader. The  basic  idea  is  quite  simple:  Suppose 
that ([t,  )  is  a  sequential equilibrium. Let  {([tn, 'Tn)} be  some  sequence  from 
iF  with  limit  (ji,  ).  Then  for  a  subform  T with  initial  nodes  W,  define  p(w)  = 
limnPq  (wW)/P( (W)  for w C  W, looking along a subsequence if necessary. It is 
straightforward to verify that 7T is a Nash  equilibrium for the game so defined. 
The reader may wonder whether something of a converse of Proposition 4 is 
possible. Namely, if w is extended subgame perfect, is it then part of a sequential 
equilibrium? The  answer  is  no,  and  an  example  is  given  in  Figure  8.  The 
information sets in  this game  are constructed so  that the only  subform is  the 
original form. Thus every Nash  equilibrium is extended  subgame perfect. The 
strategies indicated form a Nash  equilibrium, but they could never be part of a 
sequential equilibrium: No  matter what beliefs player 2 has in his information 
set, B is a better action  than A.  (And if 2 plays B,  then  1 and 3 prefer b and 
b'-the  unique  sequential  equilibrium has  the  strategies depicted  completely 
reversed.) 
We  turn next to a study of  the topological structure of  the set of  sequential 
equilibria for  generic  games.  The  analysis  follows  Debreu's  [1] study  of  the 
Walrasian correspondence. 
Fix  an  arbitrary extensive  form  and  initial  assessment  p.  To  specify  an 
extensive game, it remains to specify a payoff  vector u E  RX  Z.  We say that a 
statement is true generically or for generic u if the closure of the subset in R XZ 
for which it is false has Lebesgue measure zero. 
Let 4(u)  denote the set of sequential equilibria for the game with payoffs u. In 
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Consider the game depicted in Figure 9. This game has two types of sequential 
equilibria. The first has player 1 playing L with probability one and 2 playing 1 
with probability one.  The  second  has  1 playing A  with probability one  and 2 
playing r with probability 1/3  or more. The latter type requires 2 to have beliefs 
assigning x a probability not exceeding 1/2.  If we project J(u) into the space of 
pairs (,  (x), v (l)),  we have the picture given in Figure 10. Note  well the isolated 
point (1, 1). 
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The second example concerns the game depicted in Figure 11. It is easiest to 
think of  this game as follows.  Player 1 either chooses A  or chooses  one  of  the 
following two bimatrix games for 2 and 3 to play: 
3  3 
1  '  r'  r' 
2  |O  1  I  1  0  |I  2iLI|  1  1 ?LjiI 
(L)  (R ) 
Neither  2  nor 3 knows which  bimatrix game  is  selected.  Again  there are two 
types of  equilibria. In the first,  1 moves  R with probability one,  and  2 and  3 
respond with 1 and 1'. In the second type, 1 moves A with probability one. This 
gives 2 and 3 "freedom" in their beliefs concerning whether 1 chose L or R if 
information sets h and h' are reached. (Because we are looking for beliefs that are 
consistent, these beliefs must coincide.) To have a sequential equilibrium, these 
beliefs  must  satisfy  t(x)  E [1/2,  1/1.1],  with  resulting  equilibrium  strategies 
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T(1)  =  1/(21(x))  and  v(l')  =  [(x)/(l  +  ji(x)).  Projecting these  equilibria into 
the space of pairs (,(x),7r(l'))  we get the set shown in Figure 12. Note  that the 
isolated  point  corresponds  to  the  first  type  of  equilibrium,  and  the  curved 
segment to the second. 
In both  examples, small perturbations in u do not  affect  the basic  shape of 
4>(u)-the  same shape holds for all vectors u in a neighborhood of the payoffs 
depicted. 
These examples illustrate the structure of +(u) for generic u: 4s(u) is typically 
the union of manifolds of various dimensions. The dimensions of these manifolds 
are related to the number of "degrees of freedom" that are available in specifying 
beliefs or strategies off  the equilibrium path. The easiest case to understand is 
illustrated by  the horizontal segment in  Figure  10 and  the curved segment in 
Figure  12. In ?(u)  (as well as in the projections illustrated) these segments are 
one-dimensional manifolds derived from the one degree of freedom available to 
specify the non-Bayesian beliefs y  I  h. In Figure 12 we see that this specification 
may have some effect on the corresponding equilibrium strategies. The vertical 
segment in Figure 10 has a more subtle explanation: The "degree of  freedom" 
that exists in defining  y  on  h is lost because  y  on  h is set so that player 2 is 
indifferent between 1 and r, but this degree of freedom is regained in the choice 
of X  on h because player 2 is indifferent. 
Several definitions are required to be precise. A basis for the extensive form is 
an  index  set b consisting of  decision  nodes  x E X  and  actions  a E A.  Define 
*b=  t({zr)  E  4':  jX)  >  0  if  and  only  if  x E b,  and  7(a)  > 0  if  and  only  if 
a E  b}. The set of bases for which  'b  is nonempty is denoted by B and is called 
the set of consistent bases. Note  that B is finite and that the 'b  partition  I. 
LEMMA  2:  For b E B,  'b  is a manifold. 
This lemma is proved in the Appendix. Also in the Appendix is a characteriza- 
tion of which bases b are consistent, and a representation of the manifold *'b  for 
consistent b. 
Partition ?(u)  as follows.  Define  'b(U)  =  -(u)  n  'b.  Further partition each 
ob(U)  into two parts:  I?s(u)-the  set of strict equilibria  in  b'  wherein any action 
that does as well as an action taken with positive probability is itself taken with 
positive  probability;  Iw(u)-the  remainder of  bb(u),  consisting  of  the  weak 
equilibria  wherein some unused action does as well as the actions having positive 
probability. 
THEOREM  1: For generic u, for each b E B the set Os(u)  is either empty or is a 
manifold of dimension n(b) =  dim(*b)  -  #(b  n A) +  + H,  and the set  F  w(u)  is 
precisely  the I'  b  -relative  frontier of tV(u). SEQUENTIAL  EQUILIBRIA  881 
TABLE II 
(Db(U)  FOR THE EXAMPLE  OF FIGURE  9 
basis b  dim('Ph)  n(b)  'K(u)  (Fj'(u) 
A; x'; r  0  0  the point at the origin in Figure 9  0 
A; x, x'; r  I  I  the horizontal segment not including  the right endpoint of 
either endpoint  the horizontal segment 
A; x, x'; r, /  2  1  the vertical segment not including  the top endpoint of 
either endpoint  the vertical segment 
L; x; 1  0  0  the isolated point at the upper right  0 
The proof is given in the Appendix. An intuitive explanation of the dimension 
of  Ib(u) can be given: Fixing a basis b and an information set h, suppose that m 
is the cardinality of A (h) n  b. Then the equilibrium conditions for h consist of 
m -  1  equality constraints specifying that the expected utilities to player l(h) of 
the m  actions  he  is  mixing  among  are identical,  and  some  further inequality 
constraints. Each  equality constraint lowers the dimension  of  the manifold  of 
equilibria by  one,  so when we  sum over all h we have exactly n(b)  remaining 
dimensions of  "b 
To see how this theorem works, consider again the game depicted in Figure 9. 
The bases b E B such that JD'(u)  is nonempty are tabulated in the left column of 
Table  II. Also  tabulated are dim(Ib)  and n(b).  In  the next  column,  Ib(u)  is 
described, relying on Figure 9. And in the right column, the associated  Jbw(u) is 
described. 
This theorem points out that typically there is an infinite number of sequential 
equilibria. This may be misleading, however. The infinite number ensues from 
free variations in allowed behavior and beliefs off the equilibrium path. To be 
more precise, for a fixed extensive form and initial assessment p, define 
Au  =  { P(  -  ) E A1: There exists some y such that ( I, w) E  >(u)} 
In  a  sense,  Au is  the projection of  0(u)  onto  A. Note  that a  measure 6 E Au 
represents an equilibrium prior probability assessment on  the terminal node  at 
which the game will end. 
THEOREM  2:  For generic u, the set Au is finite. 
The  proof  is  given  in  the  Appendix.  Also  in  the  Appendix  are  further 
characterizations of the topological properties of the correspondences ?(u)  and 
Au. We add two comments here. First, Theorem 2 remains true if we look at all 
Nash equilibria and not only at sequential equilibria. Second, for generic normal 
form games the set Au has odd cardinality. In contrast, this is not the case for 
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7.  PERFECT EQUILIBRIA 
In this section we establish the relation between sequential and perfect equilib- 
ria. The  reader familiar with  Selten's [15] exposition  of  the  merits of  perfect 
equilibria will  recognize  that  our justification  for  the  criterion of  sequential 
rationality substantially overlaps his. Indeed, our analysis has relied heavily on 
the creative insights of Selten's original work, and on the related contributions of 
Harsanyi [4]. We have nevertheless proposed a definition that is formulated quite 
differently, and that yields somewhat different properties. Our approach involves 
directly the criterion of sequential rationality, whereas Selten employs an indirect 
construction to obtain a slightly stronger criterion. Our motivation for simplify- 
ing  Selten's  construction  is  principally  a  matter  of  analytic  ease.  Sequential 
equilibria are generally much easier to work with. Below we shall recall Selten's 
definition, contrast it with our own, and then show the sense in which the two are 
virtually equivalent. 
To  facilitate comparisons we formulate Selten's definition in terms of assess- 
ments. (Also,  we  shall follow  Selten's second  definition  [15, Section  12] rather 
than his first.) Recall that the set I  of consistent assessments is the closure of the 
set  I,  of  strictly positive  assessments.  We  say  that  a  convergent  sequence 
{(Anv,70)}  n=  12,..  from 'V justifies the fully consistent assessment (I,  7r)  that is 
its limit. Then, an assessment (  , vr)  E  I  is a perfect equilibrium  if it is justified by 
a  sequence  {(pn, 7n,7)} for which, for each  player i  and  each  index n,  VT' is an 
optimal response for player i to the other players' strategies (7rVT)1G. 
One can interpret this definition as the composition of two criteria. The first, 
implied by the above definition, is that each player i's strategy VT'  is an optimal 
response to the assessment (I,  w) and that, moreover, (I,  w) is a fully consistent 
sequential equilibrium. The second requires that for some sequence that justifies 
(I,  Vr), each  player's strategy is  a  robust best  response. One  can  interpret the 
difference between a strategy 7rn  in the sequence and the limit strategy Vr as the 
manifestation of particular small probabilities that the other players will err or 
"tremble", and that each player is using a response that is optimal in the event of 
such errors. It is the second of these two criteria that we forego in the definition 
of a sequential equilibrium. This makes apparent the following. 
PROPOSITION  5:  Every  perfect equilibrium  is a sequential equlibrium. 
The  converse  to  this is  false.  In  the  game  depicted  in  Figure  13, player  1 
moving  L  and  2  moving  r  is  a  sequential  equilibrium  that  is  not  perfect. 
Moreover, one can find more complicated games with weak sequential equilibria 
that are not perfect for all payoffs u in a neighborhood of some u*. However, the 
following partial converse to Proposition 5 is true. 
THEOREM 3:  For any fixed  extensive form and initial assessment p, for generic 
payoffs u every strict sequential equilibrium  is perfect. Also, for generic  payoffs u the 
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FIGURE  13. 
In other words, for generic payoffs, only weak sequential equilibria present a 
problem, and then only off the equilibrium path. From Theorem 1, we know that 
(generically) "almost every" sequential equilibrium is  strict, so  we  can  further 
paraphrase Theorem 3 as follows: For almost every game, almost every sequen- 
tial equilibrium is perfect. The proof is in the Appendix. It is a corollary of the 
construction in the Appendix, moreover, that the sets of sequential and perfect 
equilibria fail to coincide  only at points u where the perfect equilibrium corre- 
spondence fails to be upper hemi-continuous. 
By modifying Selten's definition of perfection, we can obtain exact coincidence 
of sequential and "perfect" equilibria. To motivate this, we embellish the motiva- 
tion for perfect equilibria: Imagine that some player i is predicting the behavior 
of  another player j.  To  do  this requires that i  consider j's  predictions of  the 
behavior of everyone else. That is, the Nash criterion requires that j's behavior 'gJ 
be a best response to the particular prediction (7Tk)k,.  of others' behavior. Selten 
has added that j's  behavior gi  must also be a best response to some sequence of 
strictly positive strategies (Ogn  )k+j  that approach g. The interpretation is that if 
some information set h C  t-  1(j) is reached that has zero prior probability under 
,z, thenj  will interpret this event to result from some (vanishingly) small chance 
of a sequence of "errors"  and proceed to optimize accordingly. That is, player i 
must suppose that j's  actions are a robust best response. This all supposes that i 
knows j's  payoffs.  We  can  slightly  relax  Selten's  criterion by  allowing  some 
(vanishingly) small uncertainty on the part of i aboutj's  payoffs; thenj's  strategy 
need only be a best response to the perturbed strategies for some payoffs forj 
that are "close" to u. Formally we have the following definition. 
DEFINITION:  An assessment (  , ,g) c  T  is said to be a weak perfect equilibrium 
for payoffs  u if there exists a sequence  {( [y,  u,)}  C  gJTo x  R'>x  Z  that has the 
limit (I,  z, u) and that satisfies, for each n and player j,  7Tj  is a best response to 
if j's  payoffs  are  unj 
PROPOSITION  6:  For any extensive game, the sets of weak perfect and sequential 
equilibria coincide. 
The proof is quite straightforward, so we only sketch the main idea and leave 
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an n. Then working backwards through the game tree, it is possible to perturb 
slightly each uj so that 7Tj  is a best response to (7T k  #I  for the perturbed payoffs. 
(See Part 2 of the Appendix for further details on this backwards recursion.) 
While we are concerned in this paper with extensive games, our three theorems 
combine  to  give an  interesting corollary for normal form games. In  a  normal 
form  game,  every  Nash  equilibrium is  sequential.  Moreover,  knowing  P'  is 
equivalent to knowing g. Thus we conclude that for generic normal form games, 
there is a finite number of Nash  equilibria, every one of which is perfect. 
8.  RESTRICTIONS ON BELIEFS 
Besides  being  easier  to  apply  than  perfectness,  the  concept  of  sequential 
equilibrium possesses a second advantage. This is that the formulation in terms 
of players' beliefs gives the analyst a tool for choosing among sequential equilib- 
ria.  In  some  cases  one  can  predict  that  one  equilibrium among  several will 
prevail because only the beliefs that sustain the one are intuitively plausible. An 
example illustrates this. 
Consider the game depicted in Figure 14, due to Kohlberg [5]. One sequential 
equilibrium for this game has  1 playing A and 2 playing r. This is supported by 
beliefs on the part of 2 that y(x)  <  1/2.  A second equilibrium has  1 playing L 
and 2 playing 1. In this equilibrium, 2's beliefs are determined by l's strategy. We 
contend  that the second equilibrium is more intuitively plausible than the first, 
because 2's beliefs in the first are implausible. Player 2 "ought" not to conclude, 
upon reaching h, that 1 chose R, because R is dominated by A for  1. The only 
beliefs by 2 that make sense assign y(x)  =  1 (or, at least,  >  1/2),  which leads 2 
to prefer 1. Player 1, realizing this, prefers L. 
Now  consider  the  following  modification  of  this  game.  Suppose  that  by 
choosing A, player 1 causes the following simultaneous-move, bimatrix game to 
be played: 
2 
2,1  0,2  -10,4 
104  22,2  -8,1 
Player 2 will know that 1 chose A and that they are therefore playing this game. 
In this bimatrix game, there is a unique Nash  equilibrium where 1 receives the 
1 _  A  01 
1  L 
x*  2-  h ---*x 
2  -10  -1  0 
-1  -2  -2  -1 
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expected payoff  1. Again we have a sequential equilibrium in  the whole  game 
where  1 chooses  A  because  2,  upon  reaching h,  can  assess  y(x)  <  1/2  and 
therefore play r. And again we argue that this is implausible because 2's beliefs 
are implausible. It is no longer the case that playing A guarantees 1 more than he 
can ever get by playing R. But playing A yields an expected equilibrium payoff 
of  1, which is more than  1 gets from R,  so 2 "ought not" to attach too  much 
weight to the possibility that 1 played R given that 1 has not played A. Again we 
are led to the equilibrium L and / as more plausible. 
One  can  also interpret Myerson's [10] concept  of  a proper equilibrium as  a 
restriction  on  beliefs.  Myerson  argues  (essentially)  that  assessments  off  the 
equilibrium path should be  such that the preponderence of weight goes  to  the 
"least costly" mistakes. A  third example of this approach is used in Kreps and 
Wilson [6, Section 3]; there assessments off the equilibrium path are developed 
by asking which of two players is more likely to defect from a given equilibrium. 
The point  that we wish to make is that the basic description, and justifying 
feature, of sequential equilibria, namely probabilistic reassessments of beliefs off 
the equilibrium path, provide an apparatus for comparing sequential equilibria. 
Some sequential equilibria are supported by beliefs  that the analyst can  reject 
because they are supported by beliefs that are implausible. We will not propose 
any formal criteria for "plausible beliefs" here. In certain cases, such as Myer- 
son's concept  of properness, some formalization is possible. In other cases it is 
not clear that any formal criteria can be devised-it  may be that arguments must 
be  tailored to the particular game. But whether this is done  formally or infor- 
mally, we believe that this perspective can occasionally  be employed to advan- 
tage. 
9.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
The  criterion of  sequential  rationality is  familiar in  the  analysis  of  single- 
person  decision  problems.  It justifies  the  standard "roll-back" procedure  for 
constructing a sequentially optimal strategy in a problem described by a decision 
tree. Extensive games are multi-person decision problems. Though  complicated 
by  the  interactions  among  players,  they  are  not  different  in  substance.  An 
extensive game with perfect recall factors into decision problems (and associated 
decision trees) for each player. The complicating feature is that the events in one 
player's decision tree may correspond to actions of others. A player's probability 
assessments must, therefore, depend upon anticipations of others' strategies. An 
equilibrium in Nash's  sense supposes that strategies are "common knowledge" 
among the players. Consequently, strategies and beliefs are intertwined in com- 
plicated  ways  by  the information structure of  the game. To  satisfy  sequential 
rationality one must use them in concert to verify an equilibrium. 
We have formulated the concept  of  sequential equilibrium to emphasize this 
view. Compared to the weaker criterion of Nash  equilibrium, the salient differ- 
ence is the key role of players' beliefs off  the equilibrium path in  determining 
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stronger criterion of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, the difference is mainly 
one of tractability. The simpler mathematical properties of the sequential equilib- 
rium correspondence reflect the simpler formulation of the basic criterion. 
We envision the criterion of sequential equilibrium as a step towards unifying 
the  formulations  and  methodologies  of  game  theory  and  statistical  decision 
theory.  Among  the  prospective  applications  are  analyses  of  games  modeling 
competitive strategies in dynamic and uncertain environments. The criterion of 
sequential rationality subjects the (usually) many Nash  equilibria to a stronger 
test. As  Selton  has  noted,  it  is  particularly effective  in  eliminating  equilibria 
sustained by "threats" that would be nonoptimal to carry out. 
The  idea  that an  assessment,  namely  a  beliefs-strategy pair, is  the  relevant 
descriptor of  an  equilibrium is, we  contend,  a  central principle. Analyses  that 
ignore the role of beliefs, such as analysis based on normal-form representation, 
inherently  ignore  the  role  of  anticipated  actions  off  the  equilibrium path  in 
sustaining  the  equilibrium  essentially,  such  analyses  allow  almost  arbitrary 
behavior off the path. This lacuna often weakens the normative implications of 
the analysis, and in the extreme yields Nash equilibria that are patently implausi- 
ble. This is not to say that the sequential equilibrium concept  eliminates all or 
even most implausible equilibria. But it does eliminate some, and, perhaps more 
importantly, it gives a language for discussing why one equilibrium or another is 
implausible. 
We close by noting that the ideas here are not original to us. We have already 
cited the seminal work of Harsanyi and Selten, but it would be remiss not to do 
so  again.  Selten's work on  perfection  goes  at precisely the problem we  began 
with. Our concept of sequential equilibrium allows a somewhat freer interpreta- 
tion  of  the nature of  beliefs  off  the equilibrium path,  in that Selten motivates 
them entirely by "trembling-hands." But mathematically the two are equivalent 
(for fully consistent assessments). (The other distinction, that we require optimal- 
ity only "at the limit," while Selten requires optimality approaching the limit, is 
what is significant in terms of tractability and mathematical properties.) And our 
freer interpretation springs directly from Harsanyi's work on  games  of  incom- 
plete information-we  simply apply  those ideas  to players' decision  tree prob- 
lems off the equilibrium path. Also, recent papers by Fudenberg and Tirole [2], 
Milgrom  and  Roberts  [8],  and  Rubinstein  [12]  contain  the  basic  idea  of  a 
sequential equilibrium without being quite so formal about it as we have been. 
Stanford University 
Manuscript  received  February,  1981; revision  received  June, 1981. 
APPENDIX 
In this Appendix we  prove Lemma 2 and Theorems  1,  2, and  3. We begin by  considering  the 
structure of the sets "b,  developing characterizations of consistent bases, and an explicit representa- 
tion of  'b.  Lemma 2 is then proven, and  an extension  is given  that will be  used in the proof  of 
Theorem 3.  In  the  second  part of  the  Appendix,  we  present a  general construction  that  is  used SEQUENTIAL  EQUILIBRIA  887 
repeatedly in the proofs of the theorems. Then in the third part of the Appendix, we give proofs of 
the  three theorems. The  basic  mathematical  tool  of  our  analysis  is  Sard's Theorem,  used  in  the 
fashion initiated by Debreu [1]. 
A. 1. THE STRUCTURE  OF "4h 
To simplify formulae, we assume throughout this section that p  1/#  W. This is for notational 
convenience only-none  of the analysis to follow depends on this at all. 
Begin with  a  definition.  A  labelling for  the  extensive  form  is  a  function  K  taking A  into  the 
nonnegative integers. For a given labelling K, there is an associated function JK  on X  defined by 
l(X)-  I 
JK(X)  =  E  K(a(  pj(x))). 
1=0 
If x E  W, then set JK(X)  =  0. That is, K labels the branches of the tree with nonnegative integers (in a 
way that respects the informational constraints of the game) and JK gives for each node x the sum of 
the labels on branches from the beginning of the tree to x. 
The labelling K is said to be a b labelling if: 
(A.l)  (a) for every h, there is some a  E A (h) with K(a)  =  0; 
(b) a E  b if and only if K(a)  = 0; 
(c) x E b if and only if x minimizes JK()  on H(x). 
LEMMA  Al:  The basis b is consistent ('b  is nonempty)  if and only if a b labelling exists. 
PROOF: Suppose that a b labelling K exists. Fix any strategy S7  E 1II and define strategies 7T  E  rIT 
by 
Wn(a)  =  c(n,  H(a))7T(a)(  I/n)K(a), 
where  c(n, H(a))  is  defined  as  the  appropriate normalizing  constant.  Letting  U,n be  the  beliefs 
consistent with 7Tn it is obvious that the sequence {( tin,  Tn)} converges to some assessment (  , 7) that 
belongs to the basis b. Thus 'b  is nonempty. 
Now  suppose  that  b  is  a  consistent  basis.  Since  'b  is  nonempty,  there  exists  a  sequence 
{(  7n  Tn))}  C '0  with the limit (  ,  7)  belonging to 'b.  Let M  denote the finite set of all first degree, 
single term multinomials with coefficient one in the symbols a  E A. For m E  M,  let mn represent m 
evaluated with a =  ~n(a).  Without loss of  generality, we can assume that for every pair m and m' 
from M, the sequence mn/mn  converges either to zero, to infinity, or to some strictly positive number. 
(This is wlog because we can  look  along a subsequence of  {( I?X  )}for  which  it is true.) Define 
m <  m' if lim mn/m'  =  oo; then  <  is an asymmetric and negatively transitive binary relation on M. 
Since  M  is  finite  there exists  an  integer  valued  function  J  on  M  with  m <  m'  if  and  only  if 
J(m)  < J(m').  We can pick J so that J(m)  = 0 for the  < -least m-then  J(m)  > 0 for all m. For each 
x E  X there is an associated mx E M, namely 
l(X)-  I 
mx=  a(p1(x)). 
1=0 
(For x  E  W, m-Y  =  1.) Now  for each a  pick an arbitrary x E  H(a)  such that J(m')  is minimal over 
x E H(a)  and define 
K(a)  = J(mx  *  a)  -  J(m-4). 
We leave to the reader the relatively easy tasks of proving that K(a) is well-defined (i.e., the choice of 
a J(m-')-minimal  x E  H(a)  is  irrelevant) and  that  K so  defined  is  a  b  labelling  (with,  of  course, 
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We can now give the representation of  "b.  Let  -b  be the set of functions  : A -  (0, oc) such that 
for each h e  H, 
E  ((a)=1. 
aEb  nA(h) 
That  is,  each  (  is  a  strategy that belongs  to  the basis  b  together with  an  assignment  of  positive 
numbers to all other branches. Next  define mappings  T  b  and Itb  from  -b  to II  and  the space of 
beliefs, respectively, by 
Xb(()(a)  {  if a X  b,  and 
and 
[0  if x a  b, 
yb(X)  M  l  X(()/  m  X(R)  if x e  b, 
x' Ebn  H(x) 
where mx(()  is the multinomial mx evaluated with a = ((a). 
LEMMA A2:  For each consistent basis b,  1b  iS  the image of  -b  under the mapping  (Itb,  b). 
PROOF:  Fix a consistent basis b. We first show that for  E=  -b,  (  b(  ),  b(T)) 
b 
*b.  To do this, let 
K be any b labelling (one exists by Lemma Al)  and, for n =  1, 2, . . .,  define 7Tvn()  e  I-l  by 
n (() (a)  =  c (n,  H(a))T  (a)( 1/ n)  K(a), 
where c(n, H(a))  is the appropriate normalizing constant. If ttn(()  are the beliefs consistent with Tn(() 
it is easy to see that 
inlmi  ( tin (W)  7n (0))  =t 
b 
(t),  7T  b( 
SO (Mlb((),  7b(())  E: '.  (Note  that each c(n, H(a))  goes to one.) By definition, (,b(t  )  t  b(())  has the 
basis b and hence is in *b 
Conversely, we  must  show  that  for every  ( L, 7)  EC+ 'b  there exists  E  b  with  (p  tt,7T) =(It 
qb(t))*  Fix (j,  7)  E  4',  and let {(  ,X,,}  C  '0  be any fixed sequence that justifies (has limit) (p,a). 
Let Q be the set of all algebraic expressions of the form 
q=  II  aq(a) 
aEA 
for rational numbers q(a). Note  that M is the subset of Q for which each q(a)  is either zero or one. 
Note  that Q has a countable number of elements. Without loss of generality, then, we can assume 
that  for  each  pair q, q' (  Q  the  limit  limnqn/qn  exists  (allowing  oo as  a  limit),  where  qn  is  the 
expression q evaluated with a =  r,(a).  This is wlog because we can use the standard diagonalization 
procedure to find a subsequence along which it is true. Define  binary relations  <  on  Q as before, 
and let -represent  the associated equivalence relation. 
Now  we define ((a).  For a E  b, set ((a)  =  r(a).  We shall define the remaining ((a)  one at a time, 
taking care so that at each step along the way the following statement is true: 
If q and q' are from Q with q(a)  =  q'(a)  = 0 for any a whose ((a)  value has not yet been 
assigned, and if q  q', then limnqn/qn  =  q(t)Iq  (t) 
Here q(4) means q evaluated with a = 4(a). To verify that this is possible, note first that for the initial 
assignment given above, the statement is true for a E  b-this  follows from limn7n  =  7  and  T(a) > 0 
for a  E  b. Now  suppose that we have assigned ((a)  for some subset of A so that the statement holds, 
and we try to assign ((a*)  for some unassigned a* so that it holds for the augmented subset. 
If q'and q" are two algebraic expressions in the already-assigned a and in a* such that q'-q", 
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already-assigned a.  Moreover,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  for  this  q,  a*  q.  And  if  we  ensure  that 
lim,,f,(a*)1q,  =  C(a*)/q(C)  for this q, then we will have lim,q1/q,'  = q'(C)/q"(C) for the original q' 
and q". So in checking that an assignment of ((a*)  can be made that preserves the statement, we need 
only check the cases a*  q for q an expression in the already-assigned a. 
Now  if no q in the already-assigned a satisfies a*  q, ((a*)  can be arbitrarily assigned. While if 
a*  q  and  a* -q,  we  have  q q=,  and  the  "induction  hypothesis"  implies  that  limnqn/qn  = 
q(C)/q(C), which in turn implies that the necessary assignment of ((a*), 
(a*)=  [limrn (a*)/qn  ]  -  (C) 
does not depend on which q -a*  is selected. 
All  this implies that we can find an assignment of ((a)  (with ((a) =  s7(a) for a E  b) so that the 
statement holds for all q, q' E  Q. In particular, the statement holds for each pair mx and mx  where x 
and x'  are both in b and are in the same information set. For such x  and x'  we know  that ti(x) 
and  ti(x')  are  both  greater than  zero,  and  thus  that  mx  mx'.  Therefore,  limn(Mx)n/(Mx)n= 
mx(C)/mx(C)  which  immediately  implies  that ,i =  ,  b(().  That  g =  gb(C) is  apparent, and  we  are 
done.  Q.E.D. 
PROOF  OF LEMMA  2:  We now make a convenient change of variables. Fixing a consistent basis b, 
let Zb  be the subset of D E  R  A  satisfying 
E  exp(D(a))  =  1  for every  h E H. 
aCEbn  A (h) 
Let e:  Zb  -_  Zb be the map e(D)(a) = exp(  (a)).  Clearly, e is an isomorphism. Now  redefine ,1b  and 
77b  above  so  that their domain  is  Zb.  That  is,  set 7rb(  )(a) = exp(D(a)) for a E b,  and  so  on.  By 
Lemma A2,  "b  is the image of  Zb  under the (redefined) map (1  kb,  77 b). 
Define 
E)b  =  {  9 E  RA:  :(a)  =0  ifa  E b; and for each h if x,x'  E b n h then 
I(x)-1I  I(x')-1  I 
E  (a (pl(x)))  =  E  0(a(pj(x')))  . 
I=0  1=0  J 
Note  that eb  is a subspace of RA  and that eb  +  Zb  =  Zb.  Moreover, we assert that the null space of 
the Jacobian of ( Mb,  77 b)  iS  eb  at every  point D E-  Zb.  And moreover, ( Mb,  77 b)(g)  =  (1b,  gb)(gt)  if and 
only if  - g  E'  .b 
Some  temporary  notation  will  be  useful.  For  w E R A  and  x E X,  let  Y:(x, w)  denote 
Z(x-7'  cw(a(pj(x))). Then for D E  Zb  and x  E b, h =  H(x),  we have 
A  b(l)(X)  =  exp(Y:(x, t))  E  exp  (Y(x',D 
x'ebfnh 
So for arbitrary D E Zb  and 9 E=  b  we have 
Ib(t  +  0)(x) 
=  exp(Y (x, 
' +  9))  /  exp(Y:(x',  D + 0)) 
= exp(Y:(x, D  ) + Y:(x,  9 ))  E  exp(Y:(x', D  ) + Y:(x',  9)) 
x'ebfnh 
exp(Y:(x, D)) *  exp(  (x, 0))  exp(:(x,  D)) 
xEx  eb  nh  exp  (Y_(x',)exp  (YE(x', ))  xEX-  eb  nh  exp  (YE(x',) 
=  b 
(L)fdo  T 
Of course,  ttb(t  +  f9)  =  ttb(g)  for all D' E  Zb  and 9 E eib,  since  9(a)  =  0 for a E b. Thus (  ,1b  qtb)(g) 890  D.  M. KREPS AND  R. WILSON 
=  (,yb,  b)(g.)  if D-'  E  b.  This in turn implies that eb  is always contained in the null-space of the 
Jacobian of (1  b, jb) 
Conversely, suppose that D-D  =  6  E  eb.  If 8(a) #&  0 for some a E  b, then  gb(g) 
g  Tb(gt).  And 
if  for some x  E b,  Y(x, 8)  -  E(x', 8)  for some  x' E  b n H(x),  then letting x*  be  that  element  of 
b n H(x) with  largest  Y:(  , 8), it is easy to see that  tib(_)(X*)  iS strictly  increasing  along the line from 
D' to t.  Certainly, then, (Itb,  bb)(g)  =  (b,  qb)(gt)  only if D-D'  EOb.  And certainly, the null-space 
of the Jacobian of ( Mb, X7 ) contains no vector not in eb .  (This last statement requires that we show 
that  tb(  .)(x*)  has nonzero derivative in the direction of  D  from D'. This is true, as the reader can 
verify.) 
To  complete  the  proof,  note  that  the Jacobians  of  (1kb,  7b)  at  two  points  D  and  D' such  that 
(b,  g b)(g)  =  (  b,  qb)(g  t)  are identical.  This implies  that ( Mb, qb)(Zb)  is a manifold,  with dimension 
equal to #A  -#  H -  dim(eb).  Q.  E.D. 
The proof of the lemma yields a small sharpening that is useful in the proof of Theorem 3. Let 
Zb  =  Zb  n perp(Eb)- 
Then it is clear  from  the proof  of the lemma  that (sb,  b)  is a diffeomorphism  from  Zb to *b. 
LEMMA A3:  For each consistent basis b we can find some manifold  ,0  5  40  such that '2 U "b  is a 
smooth manifold with boundary,  the boundary  being "b. 
(For the definition of a smooth manifold with boundary, see Milnor [9].) We will only  give the 
construction '2 here-verification  of  the  lemma  is  straightforward. Fix  a  b  labelling  K and,  for 
E-  Zb  and r E (0, 1), define a strategy e  r  E Ho by 
7T~,r(a) =  c(r,H(a))exp(  (r))rK(a) 
for appropriate normalizing constants c(r, H(a)).  Let Asr be the beliefs consistent with '7D  r.  Then for 
'i,  take all such (,r  T,r)  for D  E Zb  and r E  (0,  1). 
A.2.  A GENERAL  CONSTRUCTION 
In order to prove the three theorems, it will be convenient to work with the players' decision trees. 
It is easiest to think of the game tree as beginning with some initial node 0 that precedes all nodes. 
Then the decision tree (T',  -<) of player i consists of all information sets h E H',  all actions a E A', 
all terminal nodes z E  Z, and the node 0. Precedence is inherited in natural fashion from the game 
tree. (Note the reliance here on perfect recall.) The set of immediate successors to any node y  E  T\  Z 
in  i's  decision  tree will  be  denoted  by  S'(y).  The  immediate  predecessor of y  E  T' \{0}  will  be 
denoted by p'(y).  (See Wilson [6].) 
For every ( t,  g) E 4,  we obtain a corresponding transition  probability assessment on each player's 
decision tree as follows: Fixing the player i, the probability of  transition from a node h E  H'  to a 
node a E A'  where a E A(h)  (=  S'(h))  is simply g'(a).  For a node a E A(h)  where h E  H'  and for 
y  E  S'(a)  (5  H'  U Z),  the transition probability from a  to y  is defined to be  Pt,(a)(y  I h), where 
r7(a) is the strategy gr  changed so that action a is taken with certainty in information set h. Transition 
probabilities from 0 to its immediate successors, each of which will be somey  E  H'  U Z, are given by 
P'(y).  Let v' be the map from 4  to the space of transition probabilities on player i's decision tree, 
and  let  v denote  the vector map  (v')i,E.  Clearly, v is a  smooth  map,  consisting  only  of  iterated 
multiplications and additions and having derivatives of all orders. We will write v'( t, ,)(y)  to denote 
the  appropriate  transition  probability  to  a  node  y  E  T'\{O}.  Note  that  for  each  y' E  T'\Z, 
EyES(y,)  v'(ti,,)(y)=  1 for all ( 
The following is simply a matter of marshalling definitions, and so is stated without proof. 
LEMMA  A3:  For (  E  ,,)  E  4,  (,,  r)  is a fully  consistent sequential equilibrium  for payoffs u if and 
only if for each i, when we iteratively  compute 
(A.2)  (a) v'(a)  =  E  v'( ti  ,)(y)  v'(y),  for  a E A',  and 
y E  5  (a) 
(b) v'(h)  =  max  v (a)  for  h E H', 
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initializing with v'(z)  =  u'(z),  we find that a attains the maximum in (A.2)(b) if r(a)  >  0. Moreover,  a 
strict equilibrium  is where a attains the maximum in (A.2)(b) if and only if g(a)  >  0. 
That is, an equilibrium in the game  tree corresponds to "individually rational behavior" in the 
decision tree, using the standard roll-back procedure from decision analysis. 
For each player i,  let g':  TV\Z -  T'\{O}  be  any arbitrarily selected function  that specifies for 
each nonterminal node y  in i's decision tree some immediate successor g'(y)  of  this node. Define 
D' = {d  E  R  T:  d(g'(y))  =  O  for everyy  E  Ti\Z  }. 
In words, d E  D'  assigns numbers to every node in i's decision tree, with the constraint that zero is 
assigned to the nodes selected by g'  (one in every set of immediate successors to some nonterminal 
node.) Note  that dim(D')=  #Z.  Recall that U' =  R Z denotes the space of payoffs for player i. 
For  each  (p  y,)  E 4'  and  u' E  Ui,  recursively define  a  function  vI'( p.  r,  u')  on  T'  by  setting 
v'(i,  g,u')(z)  =  u'(z)  for z E  Z, and, fory  E  T'\Z, 
(A.3)  v'  ( i,  'r, u')y)  =  Z  vi( ,  g)(y')  vI( ,  sr,  u')(y'). 
y  E s'(y) 
Also define a map  y':4  x  U'-D'  by 
(A.4)  (a) yi( ,  u')(y)  =  vi(  v(,r,  ui)(y)-'V(  ,  sr,  ui)(gi(p'(y)))  for  y  E  T'\ {0), 
and 
(b) y'(  ,7,  u')(O) =  v'(  ,u')(O). 
In words, we roll-back the tree, obtaining the "value functions" v', and then we find the differences 
in values among branches leading out of each node. 
LEMMA A5:  Fixing (p., r)  E 4,  y'  is a biection from U' to D'. 
PROOF:  We  only  sketch the proof, as it is straightforward to verify but  tedious  to write out  in 
complete  detail.  For  fixed  (p,r)  and  d'  E  D',  we  will  construct  the  unique  u' E  Ui  such  that 
y'([i,  r,  u') =  d'. We do  this by "rolling forward" through the tree, constructing the corresponding 
v'(  if,  r,  u') recursively. 
Begin by setting v'( [ ,r,  u')(O) = d'(O). Note  that if (A.3) and (A.4)(b) are both to be satisfied, we 
must have 
vI  '  (,7  u  i)(0) =  PIv'(  ,u,  g)  (y)  [vi ( ,, g,  u)  i(  gi(0)) + d  '(y)] 
=  V'(i,O,U,)(gim)  +  P  v',  ,T)(y)  d'(y), 
yES'(O) 
or, for each y' E  S'(O), 
v'(  ,u,  9T, u')  (y') = vi( ,u,  9T, u')(0) -  PIv(  ,u,  9T)(y) *  d'(y) + d'(y'). 
yEsl(o) 
We can repeat this procedure throughout the tree-if  we know v'( p, 7r,  u')(y)  for any node y,  then 
(A.3) and (A.4)(b) uniquely determine vI( p, 7r,  u')(y') for all  y' E  S'(y).  Note  well that because the 
transition probabilities out of any node sum to one, there is always a solution to these equations that 
involves  only multiplication,  addition,  and subtraction.  When v'I( .,  7r, u') has been computed  for 
everyy,  we have, of course, that the unique corresponding u' is u'(z)  =  v'( p.,  7r, ui)(z).  Q.E.D. 
Define  ': 4' x  D'---  U' to be the "inverse" of yy' given in the proof above. Let D =  X,  1 D'  and 
U =  X  iI  U'.  Let 4  be  the  vector  map  (0')j,I  from  D x  4'  to  U.  Since  4  consists  of  iterated 
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LEMMA A6:  The map 4 is smooth (infinitely differentiable  in all of its arguments). In fact, 4 can be 
extended smoothly to an open domain containing its domain of definition. 
The reason for this construction can now be stated. Fix any consistent basis b, and let  B C5  A be 
such that /B  D A n b. Let D:  be the subset of D where, for each h, if t(h) =  i, then d'(a)  =  d'(a')  for 
alla,a'  EA(h)fn  /  andd'(a)>  d'(a')foralla  eA(h)  n  /  anda'  EA(h)  n  (A\  ).Note  thatD,  is 
a manifold of dimension  #  /  -  #  H less than the dimension of D. 
LEMMA  A7:  The assessment (,  7r)  E 'P is  in  1b(U)  if  and  only if, for  some  /8 D b n A,  (fi,  ) 
E proj  ,(4-  l(u) n [D: X  Pb]).  Moreover,  (Is(u)  =  proj  ,^(4-  I(u) n  [DbAA  x  'Pj) 
In words, if we look at 4) on the domain U:  3D bnA  D8  x  'Pb,  then the set of pre-images of any 
u E  U  is  precisely  the  set  of  equilibria for  u  that belong  to  the  basis  b.  This  lemma  is  a  direct 
application of the definitions of D and the map 4) and Lemma A4. 
A.3.  PROOFS  OF THE  THEOREMS 
PROOF  OF  THEOREM  1: A point u E  U will be called nice if for every consistent basis b and every 
subset 3 of A such that /3  D b n A,  the map 4) restricted to the domain D 3 X 'b  has u as a regular 
value. If u is a critical value for any of these domains, u will be said to be not nice. 
Because the number of pairs (/,,  b) as above is finite, Sard's Theorem (see Milnor [9]) implies that 
the set of not nice u has Lebesgue measure zero. We also assert that the set of not nice u is closed. 
Suppose  {un}  is  a  sequence  of  not  nice  points  that  converges  to  some  u.  Let  (dn, p,n,,rn) be  a 
pre-image of un at which the map is critical. We can bound the dn by the bounds on the p.n, 7rn, and 
uw  so without loss of generality we can assume that the (dn, ln,, 7n) lies in some single D# X 'b  and 
that they converge to some (d,  L, 7r).  If this limit (d,  L,  Jr)  lies within the manifold  DX x'b,  then 
continuity of the Jacobian of 4) on this domain assures us that u must also be a critical value, and 
hence not nice. If (d, IL,  r) lies on the frontier of D  i3  x  'b,  then greater care must be taken. In this 
case (d, ,, rg)  lies in some D X X 'bP where /3'  D /3  and b' C b. One can show (using the first part of 
the Appendix)  that any vector in the tangent map at (d, ti, r) in D,  X 'b'  can be approached by 
vectors in the tangent maps at the (dn, p,,, 7zn).  Since the Jacobian is continuous, the criticality of the 
points (dn,,  An,,gn) implies that (d, A,  s7)  is a critical point, and thus that u is not nice. 
Summing up so  far, the set of  not  nice u is a  closed  set of  measure zero. The  set of  nice  u is 
generic. 
Fix any nice u and basis b. From Lemma A7, 
41(u)  =  proj  +,(4  (u)  n  [DbnA  X 'b]). 
Because u is nice, a standard application of the regularity of u implies that 4 -(u)  n  [DbnA  X 'b]  iS 
either empty or is a manifold of dimension 
dim(DbnA)  +  dim('b)  -  dim(U)  =  #ZZ  #I-  (#(b  n  A)  -  #H) 
+  dim('b)  -  #  Z  I 
=n(b). 
The  first part of  Theorem  1 is completed  by  noting  that if  q is a  diffeomorphism carrying some 
neighborhood  of  4)'(u)  n  [DbnA  X  'Pb]  into  R(b),  then  *(p,7r)  =  n  (y(p,7,u),  ,7)  is  a 
diffeomorphism carrying the 'b-projection  of this neighborhood into Rnb). 
For the second part of Theorem 1, note that the sets D  for /3  D  A n b, /8 7# A n  b, form regular 
boundaries of DbflA-they  are hyperplane restrictions. Thus an easy extension of Milnor [9, Lemma 
4] yields that for nice u, 
-  '(u)  n  (  Ul  [Da3 X  Ob]) 
: 3#bnlA 
(i  7#  b nl A 
is  precisely  the  frontier of  4 - l(u) n  [DbnA  X  'b]  in  D X  'b.  The  same  is  clearly  true when  we 
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PROOF  OF THEOREM  2:  If ([ i,  ) E  Db(U),  then P'(*)  depends on 7r  restricted to actions a that are 
basic and that, in some player's decision tree, have only basic predecessors. Call this set of actions 
A (b). We therefore will have proved the theorem when we show that for generic u, there is for each b 
a finite number of  7 | A (b) such that (  ,  g) E (Db(U). 
Fixing a basis b, consider the extensive form constructed by  taking the tree T and deleting all 
nodes x whose actions a(x)  are not in b, together will all successors of such nodes. Call the resulting 
tree (and, loosely,  the resulting extensive form)  Tb.  Note  that in  Tb,  the set of  actions  is A (b).  If 
(, . 7) E  'b is an equilibrium for u in the original extensive form, then ([i,  g) restricted to Tb is surely 
an equilibrium for u in Tb. Moreover, 7r  restricted to Tb is strictly positive. 
Call  u very nice if  it is nice  for the original tree and  if,  moreover, its projection onto  relevant 
endpoints Tb n  Z is nice for the games given by Tb, for each b. Call u not very nice if this fails. From 
the proof of Theorem  1, we know  that the set of  not very nice points is closed  and has Lebesgue 
measure zero. That is, generic u are very nice. 
Fix  a very nice u. Applying Theorem  1, the set of  strict equilibria for the game  Tb where gr  is 
strictly positive is a manifold of dimension zero. Moreover, there are no weak equilibria for the game 
with  tree  Tb wherein all  actions  in  each  information set  are equally  good.  (This  simply  requires 
applying Theorem 1 and counting dimensions.) So the set of strict equilibria for the game Tb where gr 
is strictly positive must be finite: If the set were infinite, then it would have a limit point, because the 
bound on y  and gr  combined with fixed u yields a bound on d. Any limit point is an equilibrium in 
which all actions in each information set are equally good. And  no such limit point can be strictly 
positive-it  then would not be part of a manifold of dimension zero-nor  can it have some action 
taken with zero probability-for  very nice u there are no equilibria for the game with tree Tb wherein 
all actions in each information set are equally good and where some action has probability zero. 
Putting everything together, this shows that for generic (very nice) u, Au must be finite.  Q.E.D. 
Some comments are in order. As an immediate corollary to this, for generic normal form games 
there are a finite number of equilibria, none of which is weak. Secondly, Theorem 2 as stated applies 
equally well to the standard Nash  equilibrium definition, by exactly  the same argument. (If  gr  is a 
Nash  equilibrium for T, and A(b)  is formed in the fashion above,  then  gr  must be  a strictly posi- 
tive Nash equilibrium (hence sequential) for Tb.) Thirdly, we can sharpen this result and show that in 
neighborhoods of generic u, the correspondence u >AU consists of a finite number of differentiable 
functions. 
Concerning  this last comment,  we  note  that it  ought  to be  possible  to  sharpen Theorem  1 to 
something  like  the following.  In  neighborhoods  of  generic u,  the correspondences u ==>  (u)  (for 
b E  B)  are smooth deformations of manifolds. 
PROOF  OF  THEOREM  3:  Call u wonderful  if u is very nice and if, moreover, u is a regular value of 
the mapping 0  on each of the manifolds Do x  'I'  for each b E  B and ,B D b n A  (cf. Lemma A3). 
The argumcnt in the proof of Theorem 1 easily extends to show that the set of wonderful u is generic. 
Fix  a  wonderful  u,  and  let  (p,r)  be  a  strict sequential  equilibrium.  In  particular, let  (p,77) 
E Wb(u). Then  there exists d E  DbnA  such  that (d,  ,p,rr) E-  4-Vl(u)  n  [DbnA  X 'b].  By  Milnor [9, 
Lemma 4], there exists a sequence  {(dn, Un  I  X))}  5  - I9(u)  n  [DbA  X  *?']  with limit (d, p.r).  Since 
each  (dn, [i,  n)  E 4-  9(u) n  [DbnA  X  *'],  each (in, ,n)  is a "constrained  equilibrium,"  where the 
constraints  for (in, ,n)  are rr(a)  > min(l/n, gn(a)) if a E b  and  rr(a)  >  gn(a)  if a a  b. These  con- 
straints vanish as n -> oo, so by Selten's first definition of a perfect equilibrium, (  p,  g) is perfect. 
To obtain the second half of Theorem 3, again fix a wonderful u and any sequential equilibrium 
( ,  r). By Theorem 1, we know that there are strict sequential equilibria arbitrarily close  to ( ,). 
Moreover, we claim that if (  ',  r') is a strict sequential equilibrium close enough to ( ,),  we have 
P'r(-)  =_ Pr'().  This  follows  directly  from  the  fact  that  Au  is  finite.  But  by  the  above,  (i',  r')  is 
perfect, so that P'(.)  is in the projection of the set of perfect equilibria onto A.  Q.E.D. 
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